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within the past 5 years, there has been a significant movement in political consensus 
towards an energy future with a substantially larger renewable-energy component. one 
of the major drivers is the perception that importing over 60% of our oil reduces our 
national security. a recent estimate of the hidden cost of oil dependence amounts to about 
$3 per gallon of liquid fuel excluding multiplier effects (Copulos, 007). This estimate 
includes incremental military costs, supply-disruption costs and direct economic costs. 
Many argue that energy security is a major issue that must be addressed in today’s policy 
environment.
another issue is global warming. The United States now acknowledges that global 
warming is real and that it is caused by human interventions. over two dozen national and 
international corporations have joined forces with environmental groups to ask Congress to 
enact cap and trade policies as quickly as possible (US Climate action Partnership, 007). 
The link between biofuels and global warming is that biofuels, especially cellulosic-based 
biofuels, emit much less carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than conventional petroleum 
sources. while all biofuels provide net reductions in greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions, 
cellulosic ethanol can, under certain production conditions, be carbon negative; that is, 
it actually sequesters carbon even after including the Co released when the ethanol is 
used in vehicles. If we are able to enact cap and trade GHG policy in the near future, 
biofuels would receive a credit through the cap and trade system. In other words, the 
GHG-emissions reduction achieved by biofuels could be sold to other entities needing 
to purchase the reductions. However, we will assume here that the United States does 
not adopt a cap and trade system quickly, so other policy mechanisms will be needed to 
credit biofuels for their GHG-emission reductions.
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So what we have with biofuels are two kinds of market failures, that economists call 
externalities:
• energy security, and
• GHG emissions linked to global warming.
economists argue that externalities need to be “corrected” through taxes, subsidies or 
some form of regulation. while the nation may be paying an energy security cost of up 
to $3 per gallon for liquid fuels, consumers do not pay that cost at the pump. In other 
words, markets have no way of incorporating the energy-security cost into the market 
transaction. to correct that market failure, we must either put an additional, substan-
tially higher, tax on petroleum fuels, subsidize alternatives to petroleum, or create fuel 
standards that require liquid fuel vendors to procure a certain percentage of their liquid 
fuels from domestic alternatives to petroleum. In the US political context, the tax route 
is very unlikely to happen, so we will focus in this paper on alternative fuel subsidies and 
fuel standards. Since our energy security is increased in direct proportion to the extent 
to which a domestic alternative displaces petroleum, we will focus on petroleum import 
displacement in this analysis.
Similarly, there is currently no market mechanism to “price” GHG-emission reductions 
achieved by biofuels. Thus, if we want to credit biofuels for that reduction, we will need 
to incorporate a GHG credit into our subsidy mechanism
In the rest of this paper, we will discuss and evaluate a set of alternative biofuel policies 
that could be designed to achieve the energy-security objective alone or the energy-security 
and GHG-reduction objectives together.
ethanol economics
ethanol has been produced for fuel in the United States for almost 30 years. The industry 
launch was initiated by a subsidy of 40 cents per gallon provided in the energy Policy act 
of 978. Between 978 and today, the ethanol subsidy has ranged between 40 and 60 cents 
per gallon. The federal subsidy today is 5 cents per gallon. Throughout, the subsidy has 
been a fixed amount that is invariant with oil or corn price (tyner and Quear, 006).
ethanol gets its value from the energy it contains and as an additive. It has value as 
a gasoline additive because it contains more oxygen than does gasoline (and, therefore, 
causes the blend to burn cleaner) and because it has a much higher octane ( compared 
with 87 for regular gasoline). Historically, ethanol prices have been higher than those 
of gasoline because of the additive value and because of federal and state subsidies. It is 
interesting to portray these values in terms of the relationship between crude-oil price 
and the maximum a corn dry mill could afford to pay for corn at each crude price (tyner 
and taheripour, 007). 
figure  displays the relationships between crude-oil price and break-even corn price 
on the basis of energy equivalence, energy equivalence plus additive value (assumed to 
be 35 cents per gallon for this illustration), and energy equivalence plus additive value 
plus the current federal blending subsidy of 5 cents per gallon. The energy equivalence 
line was done assuming a figure of 70%, slightly more than the direct energy equivalent. 
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 Using fig. , one can trace out the break-even corn price for any given crude-oil price. for 
example, with crude oil at $60 per barrel, the break-even corn price is $4.7 per bushel 
including both the additive premium and the fixed federal subsidy. This figure is for a new 
plant and includes % return on equity and 8% debt interest. If we consider an existing 
plant with capital already recovered, we add $0.78 per bushel to yield a break-even corn 
price of $5.50. It is important to note that additive value is currently 0 cents higher 
than the value assumed here, so ethanol producers can afford to pay another 53 cents per 
bushel under current market conditions, which are not likely to persist.
During the period 984–003, crude-oil prices ranged between $0 and $30 per bar-
rel, with only one very short-term peak above $30. with crude-oil prices in that range, 
the fixed federal subsidy did not put significant pressure on corn prices. However, with 
crude oil today around $60, there is significant pressure on corn prices. During the past 
3 years, ethanol investments in the United States have been highly profitable, with very 
short payback periods. This high profitability has attracted significant new investment in 
the industry and added substantially to corn demand. In just a few months, corn prices 
increased from about $.5 to around $3.60 per bushel, an increase of about 60%. This 
leap is leading to an emerging opposition to ethanol subsidies on the part of animal agri-
culture, export markets, and other corn users. Some are also concerned about the $4 billion 
cost of the subsidy in 007 that will grow rapidly as ethanol production increases.
future Policy alternatives
In essence, we are living an unintended consequence of the fixed ethanol subsidy. when it 
was created, no one could envision $60 oil; but today $60 oil is reality, and many believe 
oil prices are likely to remain high. So given this reality, what future federal policy options 
figure . Breakeven corn and crude prices with ethanol priced on energy and 
premium bases plus a $0.5 ethanol subsidy.
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could be considered that would support the ethanol industry but provide less incentive 
for rapid growth in the industry leading to abnormally high corn prices? Several possible 
policy alternatives may be considered:
• Make no changes and let the other corn-using sectors (particularly livestock) 
adjust as needed.
• Keep the subsidy fixed, but reduce it to a level more in line with crude oil prices 
around $60.
• Convert from a fixed subsidy to one that varies with the price of crude oil.
• Construct a subsidy policy with two components:
 – a national security component (either fixed or variable) tied to energy content 
of the fuel, and
 – a component tied to GHG-emissions reductions of the liquid fuel.
• Provide higher subsidies for cellulose-based ethanol in hopes of accelerating devel-
opment and implementation of that technology.
• Use an alternative fuel standard instead of subsidies to stimulate growth in pro-
duction and use of alternative fuels.
• Use a combination of an alternative fuel standard and a variable subsidy
No Changes
Certainly, one option is to do nothing—to let the other corn-using sectors adjust to higher 
corn prices. But as can be seen from the results in the ethanol economics and sensitivity 
analyses sections above, that option could lead to substantially higher corn prices than 
we have seen historically. It certainly would lead to higher costs for the livestock industry 
(happening already) and ultimately for consumers of livestock products. It also would lead 
to reduced corn exports. The breakeven corn prices provided above are maximums the 
ethanol industry could pay to retain profitability. whether these prices would be reached 
would depend on the rate of growth of the ethanol industry compared with the rate of 
growth of corn supply. The March planting intentions report revealed an expected 90.5 
million acres for corn, an increase of 5% over 006. with that report, the high corn 
prices moderated somewhat. However, we can certainly expect to see continued pressure 
on corn prices if no change is made in federal subsidy policy.
Lower Fixed Subsidy
Since the current pressure on corn prices comes from the combination of $60 oil and the 
5 cent per gallon subsidy, one option would be to maintain a fixed subsidy but lower it 
to a level more in line with the higher oil price. figure  depicts the corn breakeven prices 
with a 5 cent per gallon subsidy instead of the current 5 cent per gallon subsidy. The 
corn breakeven price for $60 oil becomes $3.90 instead of $4.7 under current policy. 
However, the fixed subsidy still has the disadvantage of not responding to possible future 
changes in oil prices. If oil fell to $40, the corn breakeven would be $.84, and it would 
be $4.43 for $70 oil.
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Variable Subsidy
Both the current fixed subsidy and a variable subsidy are intended to handle the energy-
security externality described above. In designing a variable subsidy, there are two key 
parameters:
• the price of crude oil at which the subsidy begins, and 
• the rate of change of the subsidy as crude oil price falls.
we will illustrate the variable subsidy using $60 crude as the point at which the subsidy 
begins. That is, when crude is higher than $60, there is no subsidy, but some level of 
subsidy exists for any crude oil price lower than $60. In this illustration, we will use a 
subsidy change value of .5 cents per gallon of ethanol for each dollar crude oil falls below 
$60. Thus, if crude oil were $50, the subsidy per gallon of ethanol would be 5 cents. 
If crude oil were $40, the ethanol subsidy would be 50 cents per gallon. Therefore, for 
any crude-oil price above $40, the ethanol subsidy would be lower than the current fixed 
subsidy. for any crude price less than $40, the subsidy would be greater than the current 
fixed subsidy of 5 cents per gallon.
figure 3 illustrates the corn break-even price for different crude oil prices if this variable 
subsidy were in effect. In this case, the corn break-even price at $60 oil for a new ethanol 
plant would be $3. per bushel, compared to $4.7 with the fixed subsidy shown in 
figure . with oil at $50, the corn break-even would be $.90 for a new plant with the 
variable subsidy. $40 oil would support a corn price of $.69 for a new plant and $3.47 
for an existing plant with capital recovered. $70 oil would yield a breakeven corn price of 
$3.65 with no ethanol subsidy. So the variable subsidy provides a safety net for ethanol 
producers without putting inordinate pressure on corn prices.
figure . Breakeven corn and crude prices with ethanol priced on energy and 
premium bases plus a $0.5 ethanol subsidy.
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for any crude-oil price above $60, there is no ethanol subsidy with the variable system, 
so ethanol-plant-investment decisions are made based on market forces alone instead 
of being driven by the federal subsidy. for any crude price between $40 and $60, the 
variable subsidy is less than the fixed subsidy, thereby providing less incentive to invest 
and less pressure on corn prices, but maintaining a safety net. However, with the fixed 
subsidy, ethanol-plant-investment decisions continue to be heavily influenced by the 
government subsidy even at crude-oil prices that render ethanol very profitable in the 
absence of a subsidy.
Two-Part Subsidy
The two-part subsidy derives directly from the externality discussion provided above. 
for this illustration, we will construct the national security part of the subsidy based on 
energy content of the renewable fuel. Thus, ethanol from corn or cellulose would have 
the same energy-security subsidy since the energy content is the same, but biodiesel 
would have an energy-security subsidy .5 times larger since it has 50% of the energy 
content of ethanol. Similarly, biodiesel would have a larger GHG-reduction component 
than corn ethanol—but lower than cellulose ethanol—because of the differences in 
GHG-emission reduction. The GHG component would be invariant with the price of 
crude oil, but the energy security part could be fixed or variable. In this illustration, we 
will assume it is fixed.
Hill et al. (006) indicate that corn-based ethanol provides a % reduction in GHG 
(compared to gasoline), and soy biodiesel provides a 4% reduction (compared to diesel). 
figure 3. Breakeven corn and crude prices with ethanol priced on energy and 
premium bases plus a variable ethanol subsidy.
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tilman, Hill, and Lehman (006) indicate that switchgrass can actually be carbon-negative; 
that is, more carbon is sequestered than is released in combustion. for cellulose ethanol, 
they calculate a 75% reduction in Co emissions. actual carbon balance depends on 
the production conditions. for purposes of this illustration, we will assume that cellulosic 
ethanol yields a 00% reduction in GHG. one could envision a GHG component of the 
subsidy keyed to an index. for simplicity, we will use these three percentage figures for 
the index values for corn ethanol, soy biodiesel, and cellulose ethanol respectively.
for the energy security component, we will key it to energy value, i.e. to the energy 
content of oil displaced. The two-part subsidy is illustrated in fig. 4. for this illustration, 
we keyed the base values for the national security component and GHG component to 
yield a corn-ethanol subsidy roughly equivalent to the current federal ethanol subsidy of 
5 cents. The base assumptions are 75 cents for the national-security component per gallon 
of gasoline equivalent and 5 cents per gallon for 00% reduction in GHG emissions. 
The resulting total subsidy values are 53 cents for corn ethanol, 85 cents for soy diesel, 
and $.00 for cellulose ethanol. Clearly, these values are just illustrative to demonstrate 
that a two-part subsidy encompassing both the national-security and GHG-emissions 
externalities would be possible to accomplish.
1for this illustration, a relatively high carbon price of $7.50 was assumed to calculate the GHG credit. Soy 
diesel and gasoline were assumed to have the same energy level and ethanol two-thirds of that level.
figure 4. two-part bioenergy subsidy.
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Incentives for Cellulosic Ethanol
Clearly, incorporation of the GHG credit as in the two-part subsidy described above would 
help stimulate production of cellulosic ethanol. However, if that is not possible or deemed 
desirable, other cellulose-targeted incentives may need to be considered. Use of cellulose 
instead of corn would also reduce the implications of ethanol production for corn exports 
and animal feed. If the state or federal government wants to provide incentives for the 
industry to move towards cellulose sources instead of corn, then targeted incentives might 
be appropriate. one method would be what is called a reverse auction. In that approach, 
the government requests that firms supply some fixed quantity of cellulosic ethanol for 
the next 0–5 years. Companies then bid for the contract to supply the ethanol with the 
lowest bidder winning the contract. another option would be to provide a tax credit to 
cellulose processors for each dry ton of cellulose converted into fuels. with either of these 
alternatives, the government could assist in launching the cellulose-based industry. So long 
as corn-based ethanol is highly profitable, it will be difficult to stimulate investment in 
cellulose technology, because it is much more uncertain and at present more costly than 
corn-based ethanol production. Thus, targeted incentives might be needed.
Alternative Fuel Standard
In his 007 state-of-the-union message, President Bush proposed a relatively large alter-
native fuel standard of 35 billion gallons by 07. That is roughly seven times current 
ethanol production. a fuel standard works very differently from a subsidy. It says to the 
industry that you must acquire a certain percentage of your fuel from alternative domes-
tic sources. In the president’s proposal, the sources could be renewable fuels, clean coal 
liquids or other domestic sources. with a fuel standard that is perceived to be ironclad, 
the industry is required to procure these alternative fuels no matter what their cost in the 
market. Most of the change in cost of the fuels is passed on to consumers, either through 
cheaper or more expensive fuel at the pump. In other words, if crude oil is much cheaper 
than alternative fuels, consumers would pay more at the pump than they would in the 
absence of the standard. If it turns out that alternative fuels are eventually less expensive 
than crude oil, consumers would actually pay less at the pump. So, in a sense, an alterna-
tive fuel standard is a different form of variable subsidy—one in which consumers see a 
price at the pump different from that without the standard. for either a fixed or variable 
subsidy, the cost of the incentive is paid through the government budget. for a standard, 
consumers do not pay through taxes but pay directly at the pump.
figure 5 illustrates the functioning of an alternative fuel standard. The two lines 
represent $40 and $60 crude oil. The horizontal axis is the cost of the alternative fuel 
(unknown at this point), and the vertical axis is the percentage change in consumer fuel 
cost compared to the no-standard case. Clearly, in the left side of the graph with low 
alternative fuel costs, consumers see little or no change in fuel cost. But with high costs 
2recent studies of the demand elasticity for gasoline (Hughes et al., 006) conclude that it is very low (–0.03 to 
–0.08) and is lower than in previous time periods. with very low demand elasticity, most of the price change 
due to supply shifts would be passed on to consumers.
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of alternative fuels (current state of technology), consumers could see significantly higher 
pump prices. If we want to achieve both energy security and global-warming objectives 
through a standard, then it would be appropriate to partition the standard with a higher 
fraction being cellulose-based fuels.
Alternative Fuel Standard Plus Variable Subsidy
In the event that crude-oil prices turn out to be quite low, consumers could see significantly 
higher pump prices than without a standard. one option to limit the consumer exposure 
would be to combine a variable subsidy with a fuel standard. essentially, there would be 
no subsidy unless crude-oil prices fell below some predetermined level, say $45. Then a 
variable subsidy would kick in, which would limit the price increase consumers would 
see at the pump. In a sense, it is a form of risk sharing so that in the event of very low oil 
prices, the government budget would take part of the hit instead of pump prices. This 
option is illustrated in figure 6. In this case, the horizontal axis is crude-oil price, and the 
curve is done for a $60 alternative fuel cost. The line on the left side that begins at $45 
crude illustrates the impact of the variable subsidy combined with the fuel standard.
Conclusions
ethanol has been subsidized in the United States since 978 from 40 to 60 cents per 
gallon. Currently the subsidy is 5 cents per gallon, and combined with $60 oil, ethanol 
production has become highly profitable. This profitability has stimulated a huge increase 
in ethanol production capacity with 6 billion gallons of new capacity under construction 
as of January 007. This increase in production is increasing corn demand and prices. 
Under the current policy, ethanol producers could still invest profitably in new produc-
figure 5. fuel-cost change from fuel standard.
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tion with a corn price as high as $4.7/bu. other assumptions could yield substantially 
higher corn prices.
one option, clearly, is to make no change in current policy. with this alternative, the 
other corn-using sectors such as livestock production and corn exports would be forced 
to make the needed adjustments. Less corn would be used in these sectors, and prices for 
all livestock products likely would increase.
If government is interested in reducing upward pressure on corn prices, alternatives to 
the current fixed subsidy of 5 cents per gallon could be considered. one option would 
be to lower the fixed subsidy. This alternative would reduce the pressure on corn prices but 
would still provide ethanol subsidies under higher oil prices when they are not needed. 
It is also invariant to underlying market conditions. 
a second option would be a subsidy that varies with the price of crude. The option 
evaluated in this paper provided no subsidy for crude oil price above $60, and a subsidy 
that increased .5 cents per gallon for each $ that the price of crude is below $60. This 
option yields a breakeven corn price for $60 oil of $3. per bushel compared with $4.7 
under the current policy.
If we want to correct both the energy-security and global-warming market failures, 
we can adopt a two-part subsidy that combines credits for energy security with credits 
for reductions in GHG emissions. That option would provide a greater incentive for 
cellulose-based ethanol. If it is not attractive, other cellulose-targeted incentives could 
be considered.
Instead of continuing subsidies, another policy path would be to switch entirely to 
alternative fuel mandates. The mandate approach takes the cost of stimulating production 
and use of alternative fuels off the government budget and, instead, puts it directly on the 
pump price of liquid fuels. If we want to consider both the energy-security and global-
warming dimensions, then it would be appropriate to partition the standard between 
corn and cellulose-based ethanol. If the risk of high pump prices in the face of possible 
figure 6. Cost of a fuel standard with a variable subsidy.
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low oil prices is deemed unacceptable, another policy choice would be an alternative fuel 
mandate combined with a variable subsidy that kicks in at very low oil prices. In that 
way, higher pump prices could be avoided if oil prices were quite low.
It is clear that much work is needed in delineating the impacts of alternative policy 
pathways. This paper attempts to illustrate some of the alternatives that will need to be 
considered.
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